Philosophy of Zettelkasten: What is the Ghost in the Box?

System · December 2022

Philosophy of Zettelkasten: What is the Ghost in the Box?

A detailed exploration of Luhmann's ZK note number 9/8,3 and what the notion of the 'ghost in the box' could mean.

emps · December 2022

And perhaps it is not yet the time to answer the question what this ghost is

Why not. This ghost is an amalgamation of your past selves (past thinking habits) that were partially imprinted on the structure of ZK while you've composed the notes.
The reason why others don't recognize the value of your ZK is exactly the same reason why any source of information might be useless: the lack of a proper background (the knowledge that your past selves have had).

In the spirit of Luhmann or with Luhmann’s hypothetical intention in mind?

Ancient Greeks and Romans thought that when one properly emulates god, one becomes its incarnation.
If you fight like a complete bastard you become Mars. Roman triumphator was clothed like Jupiter, driven in the proper chariot and regarded by others as a personification of Jupiter on Earth. It wasn't a show - he actually became (some part of) Jupiter. Triumphator even had a special slave that rode with him in the chariot and whispered "you're not god". Probably because triumphators tended to be carried away by their holyness and required a reminder that the incarnation was temporary.
If I'm not mistaken, the process was originally called apotheosis (modern meaning of this term is different - "glorification of rulers", but it was altered by Christianity in about 2-4 AD).

So when one acts like Luhmann, one becomes Luhmann. Prayers might (or might not) be optional.

edit: typos, clarity

GeoEng51 · December 2022

@emps said:
So when one acts like Luhmann, one becomes Luhmann. Prayers might (or might not) be optional.

Haha!

autonomygaps · January 2023

I think that Luhmann is clearly playing on a rich ambiguity in the German language: "Geist" means not only "ghost/spook" but also "mind" and everything mental (even mental health or "state of mind" = Geisteszustand). In addition, it can be translated as "Spirit" in the sense of the "spirit of the age". In philosophy (my field), "Geist" is strongly associated with Hegel. His Phänomenologie des Geistes was once translated as "Phenomenology of Mind" but is not standardly translated as "Phenomenology of Spirit". But for Hegel – and Luhmann would have clearly been playing on this – "Spirit" is a very rich concept, referring to all aspects of culture, thought, practice, and more. So, in this passage, Luhmann is highlighting the absurdity of thinking that you can see his ideas by looking at the Zettelkästen. It would be like looking at the brain and expecting to see thoughts, or looking at a chessboard and thinking that the game is in the pieces of carved wood on a checkerboard.

Sascha · January 2023

So, in this passage, Luhmann is highlighting the absurdity of thinking that you can see his ideas by looking at the Zettelkästen. It would be like looking at the brain and expecting to see thoughts, or looking at a chessboard and thinking that the game is in the pieces of carved wood on a checkerboard.

Pretty similar to the thinking behind software agnosticism.

rl911 · January 2023

Luhmann :

Ghost in the box? Viewers come. They get to see everything and nothing but that - like in a porn film. And the disappointment is correspondingly high.

Zettelkasten II Zettel 9/8,3
Geist im Kasten? Zuschauer kommen. Sie bekommen alles zu sehen, und nichts als das – wie beim Pornofilm. Und entsprechend ist die Enttäuschung.

rl911 · January 2023

which closes the circle again ... you should not only read the rss-feed

chrisaldrich · October 2023

With Hallowe'en just around the corner, I'm reminded that there are "other" versions of Geist im kasten 👻🗃️:

Content warning: paper-based zettelkasten nightmares.

https://i0.wp.com/boffosocko.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Ghostbusters-card-catalog.gif?resize=635,270&ssl=1

harr · February 17

Ryle is a very plausible candidate. "Ghost in the box" as word play on "Ghost in the machine" makes sense, if we look at this excerpt from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949), chapter 1 Descartes' Myth, section (2) The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine (emphasis mine):

I shall often speak of [the official theory], with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category-mistake. (…)
I must first indicate what is meant by the phrase ‘Category-mistake’. This I do in a series of illustrations.
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks “But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University." It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum and the University, to speak, that is, as if ‘the University’ stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members.

When Luhmann's visitors were disappointed, despite having seen everything, they could have made such a category-mistake. If we replace "University" with "Zettelkasten", we get:

The Zettelkasten is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the Zettelkasten has been seen.

That's very much how I would explain a Zettelkasten. The magic is how the parts are organized and coordinated. The magic is the workflow.

EDIT: Zettel 9/8,3 is part of Zettelkasten II's 9/8 branch, used by Luhmann to prepare the famous article Kommunikation mit Zettelkästen.

What is the article about? Luhmann approaches the Zettelkasten with communication theory ("kommunikationstheoretischen Ansatz"). He posits, that he communicates with the Zettelkasten, that it is a communication partner ("Kommunikationspartner").

Then he asks rhetorically: “How must the slip box be set up so that it acquires the corresponding communicative competence?” ("Wie muß der Zettelkasten angelegt sein, damit er entsprechende kommunikative Kompetenz erwirbt?") He answers with a description of his technique ("Technik").

What happens when you work with that technique for a while? “As a result of prolonged work with this technique, a kind of second memory emerges — an alter ego with which one can continuously communicate.” ("Als Ergebnis längerer Arbeit mit dieser Technik entsteht eine Art Zweitgedächtnis, ein alter Ego, mit dem man laufend kommunizieren kann.")

The article explains, what the visitors couldn't see in the box. As Ryle says, there is no "ghost" in the box/machine. There is no separate entity. There's only organisation and coordination.

Luhmann's article explains in detail how his Zettelkasten is organized and coordinated. He goes even a step further and describes it as communication partner. What makes the Zettelkasten a communication partner is not a ghost — it's a technique.

There is no ghost in the box.

Sukhovskii · February 27

My two cents on the topic in collage animation format

Sascha · February 27

The intro is just awesome.

For the content: Agreed.

harr · February 27

I'm still having nightmares from the halloween video. :-)

May I should build a ghost in the box to calm the nerves.

harr · March 10

Continuing a discussion from another thread, that references this thread here.

This comment by @Zettelkasten101 mentions the non-existing ghost in Luhmann's box:

I don't believe this ghost in the box exists, as @harr puts it in the comments under the article. Therefore, I can't be disappointed. Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those. Luhmann only said that 1) because of his theory, which I have no interest in, 2) as a metaphor, or 3) because he deceived himself. Which one of these, I don't really care. It can even be all three at once. Meanwhile, his techniques are so interesting to me that I am anything but disappointed while watching this "porn movie".

@Sascha replied here.

@Sascha said:
The "ghost" equals roughly to the constructs in psychology. Constructs like IQ or costumer satisfaction are created to deal with things that you can’t physically drop on a scale or measure with a ruler.

I had to look up "constructs". They seem to be an interesting concept.

But how do you make the connection to Luhmann's note?

@Sascha said:
Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

Do you have a particular term in mind?

@Sascha said:
These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Which of Luhmann's terms are do you mean in particular?

@Sascha said:
Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

Yes, you could say that and you would be right! I like Carl Sagan's premise in Dragons of Eden:

My fundamental premise about the brain is that its workings—what we sometimes call “mind”—are a consequence of its anatomy and physiology, and nothing more. “Mind” may be a consequence of the action of the components of the brain severally or collectively.

@Sascha said:
Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

I never heard anybody talk about "Geist" or "ghosts" in this way. Is this your own insight or do you have examples of other writers' work who use "Geist" or "ghost" in the sense of psychological constructs?

How do you know, that Luhmann didn't mean "mind", when he wrote "Geist"? Mind as in "mind in a box" or "mind of a box"? In the final article Kommunikation mit Zettelkasten Luhmann talks about the Zettelkasten's "geistiges Leben", which could be translated as "mental life".

Mind can be described as some kind of emergent phenomenon. Some parts of the article Kommunikation mit Zettelkästen make more sense, when you are aware of Luhmann's work on autopoiesis.

Personally I like to translate "Geist im Kasten" on the Zettel as "ghost in the box", because it works as a playful reference to Ryle's ghost in the machine and Ryle's story about disappointed visitors.

Luhmann's corresponding article Kommunikation mit Zettelkästen deals more with questions of mind.

Sukhovskii · March 10

@harr
There is another related topic, too.
https://forum.zettelkasten.de/discussion/2868/kommunikationspartner

Zettelkasten101 · March 10

Well, if we have to go into this, full disclosure: my favourite philosopher is Martin Heidegger and I stand pretty much where he stands regarding all questions of "mind". Basically, his philosophy is about direct description of things the way they are, i.e. it rejects any supposed constructs that we cannot observe. Secondly, Heidegger argues that there is no "mind" if by "mind" we understand some kind of capsule or container for thoughts that is supposed to exist somewhere in our heads. What happens instead is that things are themselves meaningful, and we perceive their meaning directly from their places in our world. Simply put, thinking isn't something that happens inside our heads or brains but a relationship with our world, a kind of perception. I hope this short summary suffices to understand what I have to say below, I can unfold the explanation further if needed (though I am not a specialist in Heidegger and may not know something).

@Sascha said:

@Zettelkasten101 said:
I don't believe this ghost in the box exists, as @harr puts it in the comments under the article. Therefore, I can't be disappointed. Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those. Luhmann only said that 1) because of his theory, which I have no interest in, 2) as a metaphor, or 3) because he deceived himself. Which one of these, I don't really care. It can even be all three at once. Meanwhile, his techniques are so interesting to me that I am anything but disappointed while watching this "porn movie".

The "ghost" equals roughly to the constructs in psychology. Constructs like IQ or costumer satisfaction are created to deal with things that you can’t physically drop on a scale or measure with a ruler.

Exactly, they are created, meaning they don't exist before being created, they are added to the phemonenon. Much like the notion of "ghost" can be added to Zettelkasten but not observed there in the first place.

In the Zettelkasten world, these constructs are things like layers, complex ideas (ideas that span over multiple notes), and trains of thought.

Everything mentioned here exists and can be directly observed. Not really the case with the "ghost".

Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Are they? I think I make perfect sense of the Zettelkasten and its user when I say that it's a system of notes that allows the user to place and subsequently find similar thoughts together, be it with branches or links (this description can be elaborated further describing other aspects, like bibliography etc). Do I really need an unknown "ghost" here to make sense of the Zettelkasten? Or will its introduction just make the description confusing?

Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

Necessary for who? Making what sense? Observe or add? Honestly, I don't get what is it that we can observe with this ghost here. I don't even see how it can be "used" as an "instrument" for something. What are the benefits?

Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says. It also says that you can't find people's thoughts if you look at their brains, but that people may lose some or all of their possibilities of existing (e.g. thinking, speaking, walking, or even life itself) if something happens to their brains. Nothing in this simple observation, however, says that people's thoughts are some things that are somehow located in their brains. We can only conclude that brains are a necessary requirement for perceiving the meaning of things of our world from their places, much like our eyes are needed to see things from where they are but don't contain those things.

At the same time, a simple observation tells me that the Zettelkasten is not a human being, it doesn't live, doesn't talk. Everything I observe while working with it is that the notes that I myself wrote and put in there are conveniently located next to similar notes or linked to them (because that's how I put them in there). I also see that this helps me notice and think some new things when I reread my notes. Nothing in this simple observation tells me anything about a "ghost".

If we say that this rediscovery of my notes with conveniency can be called "communication", then perhaps the Zettelkasten can be called a "communication partner". If we then change the meaning of the word "ghost" to correspond to this, then we can say it's also a "ghost". Although in this case, the "ghost" still is a box of notes, not something that "lives" "somewhere (where?) inside" it. We can change the meaning of the word further if we really want. But the more we do this, the higher the risk of confusion gets. We may start to think that this "ghost" should be perceived as "something separate" from the notes, their contents, their arrangements. We may start to think that this "separate entity" is somehow "behind" the fact that we conveniently find similar notes close to each other or come up with something new while rereading them. But at this point it's no longer about generalization and higher levels of abstraction. Now it's about some unknown entity that we ourselves created in our thoughts and to which we try to attribute something that didn't need this attribution to be clearly understood at all. Shouldn't we draw a line here? I think we should, because there is a pretty clear line between 1) coming up with a general term for something directly observable (notes, links, surprises) and 2) creating some new entity which is supposed to "cause" these directly observable phenomena or be otherwise distinct from them.

When Luhmann spoke about a "ghost", it was either a metaphor or a self-deception (I doubt this one can be attributed to his theory). Why should we use this metaphor (at least I hope it's a metaphor) while risking to deceive ourselves and others with it? I don't know and I think we shouldn't. A surprise of unexpected thoughts doesn't require any explanation. It can be left to be what it is — a surprise.

P.S. I see how many things I wrote here can raise questions, but I hope that I managed to convey the "bare minimum" without getting into unnecessary detail. If you aren't interested in getting deeper into Heidegger's philosophy (much like I'm not interested in Luhmann's theory), that's perfectly fine by me. In fact, I would prefer not to get too deep into this (this is really not the kind of discussions I came here for).

harr · March 11

@Zettelkasten101 said:
Basically, his philosophy is about direct description of things the way they are

That's something I care a lot about. I have to read Heidegger. :-)

Secondly, Heidegger argues that there is no "mind" if by "mind" we understand some kind of capsule or container for thoughts that is supposed to exist somewhere in our heads.

I think that's the same point that Gilbert Ryle is making.

@Zettelkasten101 said:
This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says.

Yes! And there's whole branch of psychology, behaviorism, that doesn't care about "minds" at all, it simply observes and analyzes how human beings behave.

At the same time, a simple observation tells me that the Zettelkasten is not a human being, it doesn't live, doesn't talk.

Yes.

(…) Nothing in this simple observation tells me anything about a "ghost".
If we say that this rediscovery of my notes with conveniency can be called "communication", then perhaps the Zettelkasten can be called a "communication partner". If we then change the meaning of the word "ghost" to correspond to this, then we can say it's also a "ghost". Although in this case, the "ghost" still is a box of notes, not something that "lives" "somewhere (where?) inside" it. We can change the meaning of the word further if we really want. But the more we do this, the higher the risk of confusion gets. We may start to think that this "ghost" should be perceived as "something separate" from the notes, their contents, their arrangements. We may start to think that this "separate entity" is somehow "behind" the fact that we conveniently find similar notes close to each other or come up with something new while rereading them. But at this point it's no longer about generalization and higher levels of abstraction. Now it's about some unknown entity that we ourselves created in our thoughts and to which we try to attribute something that didn't need this attribution to be clearly understood at all. (…)

I really enjoyed this line of thought. Thank you!

Shouldn't we draw a line here?

Yes.

Maybe it helps to rephrase the question. Instead of asking what "ghost in the box" could mean, we could ask:

What thought did the person Luhmann have in mind, when he wrote "Geist im Kasten?" on a paper slip, that was to be filed in his wooden box?
Does the same or similar phrases appear in Luhmann's publications? Or is this a singular remark that appears only in one personal note?
What is the appropriate english translation of "Geist im Kasten", so that Luhmann's understanding doesn't get lost in translation?
Is the ghost a separate entitity?
Does the Zettelkasten have a mind of its own?

Zettelkasten101 · March 11

@harr said:
Yes! And there's whole branch of psychology, behaviorism, that doesn't care about "minds" at all, it simply observes and analyzes how human beings behave.

Not even remotely close to Heidegger, but it would take much time to explain the differences.

That's something I care a lot about. I have to read Heidegger. :-)

I would recommend starting with the works of Medard Boss. He was a pupil of Heidegger who applied his philosophy to "psychology" and whose books Heidegger himself edited. They are fairly easy to understand compared to Heidegger's own texts and are focused on discussing what human is without going into other topics of his philosophy too much which also helps to understand them better.

harr · March 11

@Zettelkasten101 said:
Not even remotely close to Heidegger, but it would take much time to explain the differences.

No need to. :-) This was about the mind as "black box" in psychology, not Heidegger.

I would recommend (…)

Thank you!

Sascha · March 14

@Zettelkasten101 said:
Well, if we have to go into this, full disclosure: my favourite philosopher is Martin Heidegger and I stand pretty much where he stands regarding all questions of "mind". Basically, his philosophy is about direct description of things the way they are, i.e. it rejects any supposed constructs that we cannot observe. Secondly, Heidegger argues that there is no "mind" if by "mind" we understand some kind of capsule or container for thoughts that is supposed to exist somewhere in our heads. What happens instead is that things are themselves meaningful, and we perceive their meaning directly from their places in our world. Simply put, thinking isn't something that happens inside our heads or brains but a relationship with our world, a kind of perception. I hope this short summary suffices to understand what I have to say below, I can unfold the explanation further if needed (though I am not a specialist in Heidegger and may not know something).

The problem with Heidegger, or, let's say, the Heideggerian thinking, is that you can't have it both. Either, things are observable as they are in the world. Then

@Sascha said:

@Zettelkasten101 said:
I don't believe this ghost in the box exists, as @harr puts it in the comments under the article. Therefore, I can't be disappointed. Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those. Luhmann only said that 1) because of his theory, which I have no interest in, 2) as a metaphor, or 3) because he deceived himself. Which one of these, I don't really care. It can even be all three at once. Meanwhile, his techniques are so interesting to me that I am anything but disappointed while watching this "porn movie".

The "ghost" equals roughly to the constructs in psychology. Constructs like IQ or costumer satisfaction are created to deal with things that you can’t physically drop on a scale or measure with a ruler.

Exactly, they are created, meaning they don't exist before being created, they are added to the phemonenon. Much like the notion of "ghost" can be added to Zettelkasten but not observed there in the first place.

What are you trying to say?

In the Zettelkasten world, these constructs are things like layers, complex ideas (ideas that span over multiple notes), and trains of thought.

Everything mentioned here exists and can be directly observed. Not really the case with the "ghost".

If they could be directly observed, you wouldn't need abstract concepts to make the observation possible in the first place. What a complex idea or a train of thought is, is dependent on your framework of perception. If you change your framework of perception, entities that qualify as complex ideas or trains of thought change.

I infer that you place a higher epistemic status on what you deem to be directly observed. But without such a qualification, the statement that something can be directly observed doesn't mean a lot.

But the notion that something can be directly observed is at odds with the psychology of biases, the age-old learning that we tend to trick ourselves easily and with everything that is not epistemic realism. (I know, Heidegger is not exactly a realist because he questions the subject-object difference which is the precondition for epistemic problems, but he is realist enough)

Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Are they? I think I make perfect sense of the Zettelkasten and its user when I say that it's a system of notes that allows the user to place and subsequently find similar thoughts together, be it with branches or links (this description can be elaborated further describing other aspects, like bibliography etc). Do I really need an unknown "ghost" here to make sense of the Zettelkasten? Or will its introduction just make the description confusing?

Yes. Abstractions allow to generalise. Generalisation is necessary to understand the underlying principles of instances. They allow us to move from the concrete incident to the pattern.

Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

Necessary for who? Making what sense? Observe or add? Honestly, I don't get what is it that we can observe with this ghost here. I don't even see how it can be "used" as an "instrument" for something. What are the benefits?

Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says.

The ability to form theories of minds is at the basis of empathy. Forming an idea of the mind of your fellow beings is at the very basis of empathy and understanding.

But you don't qualify your statement that my analogy is wrong. At this point you just point me to a different thinking framework. So, I see my analogy unchallenged.

It also says that you can't find people's thoughts if you look at their brains, but that people may lose some or all of their possibilities of existing (e.g. thinking, speaking, walking, or even life itself) if something happens to their brains. Nothing in this simple observation, however, says that people's thoughts are some things that are somehow located in their brains. We can only conclude that brains are a necessary requirement for perceiving the meaning of things of our world from their places, much like our eyes are needed to see things from where they are but don't contain those things.

At the same time, a simple observation tells me that the Zettelkasten is not a human being, it doesn't live, doesn't talk. Everything I observe while working with it is that the notes that I myself wrote and put in there are conveniently located next to similar notes or linked to them (because that's how I put them in there). I also see that this helps me notice and think some new things when I reread my notes. Nothing in this simple observation tells me anything about a "ghost".

If we say that this rediscovery of my notes with conveniency can be called "communication", then perhaps the Zettelkasten can be called a "communication partner". If we then change the meaning of the word "ghost" to correspond to this, then we can say it's also a "ghost". Although in this case, the "ghost" still is a box of notes, not something that "lives" "somewhere (where?) inside" it. We can change the meaning of the word further if we really want. But the more we do this, the higher the risk of confusion gets. We may start to think that this "ghost" should be perceived as "something separate" from the notes, their contents, their arrangements. We may start to think that this "separate entity" is somehow "behind" the fact that we conveniently find similar notes close to each other or come up with something new while rereading them. But at this point it's no longer about generalization and higher levels of abstraction. Now it's about some unknown entity that we ourselves created in our thoughts and to which we try to attribute something that didn't need this attribution to be clearly understood at all. Shouldn't we draw a line here? I think we should, because there is a pretty clear line between 1) coming up with a general term for something directly observable (notes, links, surprises) and 2) creating some new entity which is supposed to "cause" these directly observable phenomena or be otherwise distinct from them.

Nobody said that the ghost is a separate entity.

When Luhmann spoke about a "ghost", it was either a metaphor or a self-deception (I doubt this one can be attributed to his theory).

It could be all kinds of things not just those too.

Why should we use this metaphor (at least I hope it's a metaphor) while risking to deceive ourselves and others with it? I don't know and I think we shouldn't. A surprise of unexpected thoughts doesn't require any explanation. It can be left to be what it is — a surprise.

The explanation can facilitate making better decisions on how to foster (positive) surprise.

Zettelkasten101 · March 14

@Sascha said:

@Zettelkasten101 said:
Well, if we have to go into this, full disclosure: my favourite philosopher is Martin Heidegger and I stand pretty much where he stands regarding all questions of "mind". Basically, his philosophy is about direct description of things the way they are, i.e. it rejects any supposed constructs that we cannot observe. Secondly, Heidegger argues that there is no "mind" if by "mind" we understand some kind of capsule or container for thoughts that is supposed to exist somewhere in our heads. What happens instead is that things are themselves meaningful, and we perceive their meaning directly from their places in our world. Simply put, thinking isn't something that happens inside our heads or brains but a relationship with our world, a kind of perception. I hope this short summary suffices to understand what I have to say below, I can unfold the explanation further if needed (though I am not a specialist in Heidegger and may not know something).

The problem with Heidegger, or, let's say, the Heideggerian thinking, is that you can't have it both. Either, things are observable as they are in the world. Then

@Sascha said:

@Zettelkasten101 said:
I don't believe this ghost in the box exists, as @harr puts it in the comments under the article. Therefore, I can't be disappointed. Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those. Luhmann only said that 1) because of his theory, which I have no interest in, 2) as a metaphor, or 3) because he deceived himself. Which one of these, I don't really care. It can even be all three at once. Meanwhile, his techniques are so interesting to me that I am anything but disappointed while watching this "porn movie".

The "ghost" equals roughly to the constructs in psychology. Constructs like IQ or costumer satisfaction are created to deal with things that you can’t physically drop on a scale or measure with a ruler.

Exactly, they are created, meaning they don't exist before being created, they are added to the phemonenon. Much like the notion of "ghost" can be added to Zettelkasten but not observed there in the first place.

What are you trying to say?

In the Zettelkasten world, these constructs are things like layers, complex ideas (ideas that span over multiple notes), and trains of thought.

Everything mentioned here exists and can be directly observed. Not really the case with the "ghost".

If they could be directly observed, you wouldn't need abstract concepts to make the observation possible in the first place. What a complex idea or a train of thought is, is dependent on your framework of perception. If you change your framework of perception, entities that qualify as complex ideas or trains of thought change.

I infer that you place a higher epistemic status on what you deem to be directly observed. But without such a qualification, the statement that something can be directly observed doesn't mean a lot.

But the notion that something can be directly observed is at odds with the psychology of biases, the age-old learning that we tend to trick ourselves easily and with everything that is not epistemic realism. (I know, Heidegger is not exactly a realist because he questions the subject-object difference which is the precondition for epistemic problems, but he is realist enough)

The thing here is that according to Heidegger not everything you think of some phenomenon qualifies as "abstract concept" if by this you mean "something not inherent to the phenomenon". It reminds me of his example about a church: the fact that the church is a building where people gather to do religion-related things is inseparable from the perception of the church as it is. If you don't see the church as something religion-related, then you do not see this church as church (you may still technically see it as "a building" or "something visible to your eyes"). Again, thinking is a kind of perception. Perceiving things as what they are includes thinking of them in a certain way appropriate to them.

But not all thinking is a kind of perception of things the way they are. Certain ways of thinking do not do justice to things. The most common example today is adding something to the phenomenon that "explains" it. E.g. the "mind" or "unconscious" is added to a human being in order to "explain" one's actions, although we can't actually observe anything like that nor is it necessary to do so to understand a human as human. Your example with customer satisfaction is also a case of this: you can't "work" with customers and their satisfaction as what they are, hence you replace them with some numbers or models (using some method) and work with them instead. These numbers or models, although useful, aren't inherent to the phenomenon of the (un)satisfied customer.

It is true that "what qulifies" as something may change in my thinking, but I can't see anyone disputing that Luhmann described complex ideas or his trains of thought on his cards unless we use these words in some highly unusual or specific meanings. Recognizing the fact that there are complex ideas or trains of thought in his notes is a case of perceiving things as what they are. They are directly observable to anyone who can read German (and Luhmann's handwriting where it isn't transcribed yet). I don't think that you perceive the Zettelkasten as what it is unless you can see that it is possible to write trains of thought there.

This is not the case with the "ghost". We can't use the usual meaning of this word here, we have to change it one way or another if we are to say that it is there. What's more, you don't have to see any ghosts in there in order to work with the Zettelkasten and to see that it can surprise you. I don't think there is any aspect of this system that you lose understanding of when you don't use the word.

Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Are they? I think I make perfect sense of the Zettelkasten and its user when I say that it's a system of notes that allows the user to place and subsequently find similar thoughts together, be it with branches or links (this description can be elaborated further describing other aspects, like bibliography etc). Do I really need an unknown "ghost" here to make sense of the Zettelkasten? Or will its introduction just make the description confusing?

Yes. Abstractions allow to generalise. Generalisation is necessary to understand the underlying principles of instances. They allow us to move from the concrete incident to the pattern.

I don't see what patterns (if any) this "ghost" would allow me to see that can't be seen with other terms.

Nobody said that the ghost is a separate entity.

Good, then it's just a highly confusing word that actually means... what?

The explanation can facilitate making better decisions on how to foster (positive) surprise.

I don't see how, so... how? And what exactly do I lose when I don't use this ghost "explanation"?

Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

Necessary for who? Making what sense? Observe or add? Honestly, I don't get what is it that we can observe with this ghost here. I don't even see how it can be "used" as an "instrument" for something. What are the benefits?

Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says.

The ability to form theories of minds is at the basis of empathy. Forming an idea of the mind of your fellow beings is at the very basis of empathy and understanding.

This is why I wrote "I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say", but I see you need clarification. We can perceive others as having thoughts, i.e. as perceiving something through thinking. This does not mean that we have to assume that their thinking happens in their heads. "Theory of mind" is not the basis of understanding, since I can perceive people as having thoughts, wishes, opinions etc without attributing all of this to some imaginary capsule called "mind" in their heads. When I say that I see and talk to people, not their minds, it doesn't mean that I perceive people as robots or other lifeless things. On the contrary, perceiving people as who they are includes perceiving them as thinking, feeling, wanting etc.

@Sascha said:
But you don't qualify your statement that my analogy is wrong. At this point you just point me to a different thinking framework. So, I see my analogy unchallenged.

By using this analogy you wanted to say (I assume) that my claim about the absence of the "ghost" because it is not directly observable is absurd because if we apply this to humans then we would have to conclude that they are nothing but a grey jelly without mind which would also be absurd in your opinion (I assume).

It is a wrong analogy because
1) A direct observation of human beings means not only opening their skulls but also observing and understanding what they do, including thinking, feeling and other things that you attribute to their "minds". This direct observation is more similar to what I meant by a simple observation of the Zettelkasten than what you assumed to qualify as a direct observation of a human being in your analogy. An accurate analogy to your "direct observation" would be saying that nothing written in Luhmann's Zettelkaten means anything.
2) We do not have to assume that people have "minds" even based on this more rich and accurate observation that I described. Concluding that people don't have "minds" is not the same as concluding that they can't think, feel etc, meaning it's not the same as concluding that they are nothing but a grey jelly. Therefore, you can't connect the absurdity of reducing people to grey jelly to denying the existence of minds. Therefore, you can't by analogy say that my denying of a ghost is absurd because denying minds is absurd (I deny both and neither denial is absurd, in other words).

Put simply, saying that there is no ghost in the Zettelkasten is indeed somewhat similar to saying that people don't have minds and I say both of these things. But saying that people are nothing but their brains is similar to saying that the Zettelkasten is but an ink randomly spilled on a bunch of paper slips, and I say neither of these things.

Is this understandable enough?

Sascha · March 20

@Zettelkasten101 said:
The thing here is that according to Heidegger not everything you think of some phenomenon qualifies as "abstract concept" if by this you mean "something not inherent to the phenomenon". It reminds me of his example about a church: the fact that the church is a building where people gather to do religion-related things is inseparable from the perception of the church as it is. If you don't see the church as something religion-related, then you do not see this church as church (you may still technically see it as "a building" or "something visible to your eyes"). Again, thinking is a kind of perception. Perceiving things as what they are includes thinking of them in a certain way appropriate to them.

It seems that you try to tightly adhere to Heideggerian thinking. But the mechanics of how you'd learn about the concept of a church is subject of psychological-scientific research. Philosophical thinking becomes speculation that is at odds with science and wisdom.

The example by Heidegger is showing that something needs to be added to the raw perception of the physical church to grasp the full "thing". This addition is the a framework that allows to make sense of what you are perceiving.

Your example with customer satisfaction is also a case of this: you can't "work" with customers and their satisfaction as what they are, hence you replace them with some numbers or models (using some method) and work with them instead. These numbers or models, although useful, aren't inherent to the phenomenon of the (un)satisfied customer.

It is true that "what qulifies" as something may change in my thinking, but I can't see anyone disputing that Luhmann described complex ideas or his trains of thought on his cards unless we use these words in some highly unusual or specific meanings.

The point is not whether complex ideas or trains of thought are present in Luhmann's Zettelkasten. The question is how to identify them and distinguish the one complex idea from the others, where a train of thought starts and ends and what type of connections qualify to join ideas to become trains of thought.

Recognizing the fact that there are complex ideas or trains of thought in his notes is a case of perceiving things as what they are. They are directly observable to anyone who can read German (and Luhmann's handwriting where it isn't transcribed yet). I don't think that you perceive the Zettelkasten as what it is unless you can see that it is possible to write trains of thought there.

This is not the case with the "ghost". We can't use the usual meaning of this word here, we have to change it one way or another if we are to say that it is there. What's more, you don't have to see any ghosts in there in order to work with the Zettelkasten and to see that it can surprise you. I don't think there is any aspect of this system that you lose understanding of when you don't use the word.

Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Are they? I think I make perfect sense of the Zettelkasten and its user when I say that it's a system of notes that allows the user to place and subsequently find similar thoughts together, be it with branches or links (this description can be elaborated further describing other aspects, like bibliography etc). Do I really need an unknown "ghost" here to make sense of the Zettelkasten? Or will its introduction just make the description confusing?

Yes. Abstractions allow to generalise. Generalisation is necessary to understand the underlying principles of instances. They allow us to move from the concrete incident to the pattern.

I don't see what patterns (if any) this "ghost" would allow me to see that can't be seen with other terms.

Nobody said that the ghost is a separate entity.

Good, then it's just a highly confusing word that actually means... what?

The explanation can facilitate making better decisions on how to foster (positive) surprise.

I don't see how, so... how? And what exactly do I lose when I don't use this ghost "explanation"?

Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

Necessary for who? Making what sense? Observe or add? Honestly, I don't get what is it that we can observe with this ghost here. I don't even see how it can be "used" as an "instrument" for something. What are the benefits?

Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says.

The ability to form theories of minds is at the basis of empathy. Forming an idea of the mind of your fellow beings is at the very basis of empathy and understanding.

This is why I wrote "I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say", but I see you need clarification. We can perceive others as having thoughts, i.e. as perceiving something through thinking.

The idea that other people have thoughts is already based on indirect reasoning based on specific assumptions and frameworks.

This does not mean that we have to assume that their thinking happens in their heads. "Theory of mind" is not the basis of understanding, since I can perceive people as having thoughts, wishes, opinions etc without attributing all of this to some imaginary capsule called "mind" in their heads. When I say that I see and talk to people, not their minds, it doesn't mean that I perceive people as robots or other lifeless things. On the contrary, perceiving people as who they are includes perceiving them as thinking, feeling, wanting etc.

@Sascha said:
But you don't qualify your statement that my analogy is wrong. At this point you just point me to a different thinking framework. So, I see my analogy unchallenged.

By using this analogy you wanted to say (I assume) that my claim about the absence of the "ghost" because it is not directly observable is absurd because if we apply this to humans then we would have to conclude that they are nothing but a grey jelly without mind which would also be absurd in your opinion (I assume).

It is a wrong analogy because
1) A direct observation of human beings means not only opening their skulls but also observing and understanding what they do, including thinking, feeling and other things that you attribute to their "minds". This direct observation is more similar to what I meant by a simple observation of the Zettelkasten than what you assumed to qualify as a direct observation of a human being in your analogy. An accurate analogy to your "direct observation" would be saying that nothing written in Luhmann's Zettelkaten means anything.

You can't observe my thinking or feeling. You only can infer by what I am saying, writing, facial expressions etc. You can only infer if you apply frameworks, both innate and learned.

2) We do not have to assume that people have "minds" even based on this more rich and accurate observation that I described. Concluding that people don't have "minds" is not the same as concluding that they can't think, feel etc, meaning it's not the same as concluding that they are nothing but a grey jelly. Therefore, you can't connect the absurdity of reducing people to grey jelly to denying the existence of minds. Therefore, you can't by analogy say that my denying of a ghost is absurd because denying minds is absurd (I deny both and neither denial is absurd, in other words).

We are not talking about abstract philosophical speculation. As part of the working of the human psyche we are assuming that people have minds.

Put simply, saying that there is no ghost in the Zettelkasten is indeed somewhat similar to saying that people don't have minds and I say both of these things. But saying that people are nothing but their brains is similar to saying that the Zettelkasten is but an ink randomly spilled on a bunch of paper slips, and I say neither of these things.

Zettelkasten101 · March 20

I see that this conversation keeps going nowhere, as I suspected it would from the start. The gap between our positions is gigantic, and I don't think it can be bridged with just a few posts.

Your position is an example of the modern subject-object ontology, which is very common and hardly ever questioned nowadays. It is based upon the assumption that our world is fundamentally split into subject and object, the subject (mind, psyche, consciousness, inner world etc) being the place where all thinking and perception of meaning happens, governed by some mechanically understood assumed forces (studied by psychology), and the object being nothing but a sum of mass points governed by causal connections (laws of physics) and completely meaningless on its own. In this ontology, only that which is measurable (and therefore predictable and controllable via causal connections) is called truly ("objectively") real. In this ontology, it is impossible to comprehend the possibility of things having meaning by themselves (how?! the meaning is subjective!), which happens to be my and Heidegger's position.

Honestly, I can't think of a better argument here than "go read Heidegger" (since immersing in his texts would explain much more than my posts), but I guess it is not my place to tell someone what books they have to spend dozens or hundreds of hours on. Whether you want to get out of the subject-object thinking or not and whether you'll ever do it is entirely up to you. I merely wanted to say that there is no ghost in the box but there are many meaningful and very contextual connections and surprises there. And no, these are not the same as the ghost, nor is it appropriate to call any of my assumed "psychological constructs" like that. I think I have managed to convey this thought well enough.

That being said, I want this set of comments to be the last one and only serve to clarify some aspects of Heidegger's philosophy for those who might be interested, not to continue the argument further:

@Sascha said:
It seems that you try to tightly adhere to Heideggerian thinking. But the mechanics of how you'd learn about the concept of a church is subject of psychological-scientific research. Philosophical thinking becomes speculation that is at odds with science and wisdom.

Well, at least you are correct about Heideggerian thinking being at odds with science, since modern psychological theories almost entirely consist of assumed things that don't really exist (according to Heidegger). Which is not to say that they aren't based on some real phenomena.

The example by Heidegger is showing that something needs to be added to the raw perception of the physical church to grasp the full "thing". This addition is the a framework that allows to make sense of what you are perceiving.

The "raw perception" in Heidegger's philosophy is always a perception of meaning. Even if you are a small child who never saw a church before, you still see it as "a building" or at least as "that huge thing", as something definite (even if you don't speak and can't call it like that yet). You don't really perceive anything separately from its meaning at any moment. The perception of color, shape and size is also a kind of meaning-perception, according to Heidegger, by the way. All of these are different ways of perceiving things as something that is in one way or another. Although your subject-object assumptions probably won't let you see that there is no reason not to see meaning as a part of what things are (or rather as everything they are, really).

Also, I should have probably always said "replace" instead of "add" in my previous posts. This would describe more accurately what you do when you think of, say, human beings as "minds". The problem isn't exactly that the meaning is "added" but that (some part/aspect of) the phenomenon itself is mistakenly replaced with something it isn't (according to Heidegger, at least). Replacing the phenomena with some models of "underlying causes" that are meant to "explain" them is business as usual in modern science, especially psychology. In contrast, perceiving the church as a religion-related building is not replacing the church with something it isn't.

You can't observe my thinking or feeling. You only can infer by what I am saying, writing, facial expressions etc. You can only infer if you apply frameworks, both innate and learned.

The fact that I can't observe everything that you're thinking doesn't mean that I can't think some of what you think by directly perceiving the meaning of your words. I can misinterpret your words, of course, but it can only happen because certain ways of misinterpreting phenomena are a part of what they are, of how they can appear to us. The fact that we may perceive things differently or even erroneously because of our different past experiences with different phenomena is still not a reason for assuming that our perception happens somewhere in our heads.

We are not talking about abstract philosophical speculation. As part of the working of the human psyche we are assuming that people have minds.

If by "assuming that people have minds" you mean "perceiving other people as capable of direct perception of meanings of things", then you are correct. But it still doesn't mean that this perception of meaning has to be attributed to some "psyche" or "mind" or other "inner world". In Heidegger's philosophy, there is no need for any inner worlds. The meanings of things are perceived directly from where they are. There is only one world, both "outer" and "inner" at the same time.

The point is not whether complex ideas or trains of thought are present in Luhmann's Zettelkasten. The question is how to identify them and distinguish the one complex idea from the others, where a train of thought starts and ends and what type of connections qualify to join ideas to become trains of thought.

To these questions I can say that it often highly depends on a person working with the Zettelkasten. Also, I believe that the boundaries of thoughts/trains of thoughts/ideas may change depending on the point of view of the same person. In Russian, I call this "переразложение контекста", which roughly translates to English as "context reanalysis". I use this term to describe a situation when you "reinterpret" some of your notes while adding new ones to create new trains of thought. In this situation new contexts appear that may overlap with the old ones but not erase them. I.e. some of the notes can be read in the context of their initial sequence or in the context of, say, their branches added later with different intentions. Such overlapping contexts may be quite distinct from each other, yet share some parts at the same time. I guess if you want to perceive trains of thought observable in the Zettelkasten as what they are, then you have to accept that there isn't always a single correct answer as to where they start and end, even for the user of the particular Zettelkasten.

ZettelDistraction · March 21

Several years ago, I attempted to engage my Zettelkasten as a communication partner. I wished to replicate the singular empirical finding of the sociologist Niklas Luhmann, who followed simple rules over and over to add and cross-reference research notes to his Zettelkasten. Eventually and unexpectedly, the Zettelkasten underwent a rapid phase transition, which it entered as a mundane filing cabinet and emerged as an independent, ideal interlocutor.

...slip boxes can be recommended as partners of communication ... How must it be conceived that [the slip box] will acquire the corresponding communicative competence? ... If you wish to educate a partner in communication, it will be good to provide him with independence from the beginning. … Naturally, independence presupposes a minimal measure of intrinsic complexity. The slip box needs a number of years in order to reach critical mass. Until then, it functions as a mere container from which we can retrieve what we put in. This changes with its growth in size and complexity.
— Niklas Luhmann. “Communicating with Slip Boxes: An Empirical Account." http://luhmann.surge.sh/communicating-with-slip-boxes. Accessed August 3, 2021.

Luhmann’s finding is not mine. My Zettelkasten grudgingly admitted me, last on its wait list, as its remedial student, a provisional status from which I have yet to recover. Years of adding notes pertaining to my former work life did nothing to advance my standing. The Zettelkasten advises me, in retirement, to leave that networked graveyard in peace.

Martin · March 22

When the Zettelkasten murmurs “graveyard”, I hear “archaeology”: dig where the ground still smoulders, not where the headstones are already inscribed.

harr · March 23

I love ghost stories. Just imagine an undead Zettelkasten's ghostly voice murmuring "graveyard". Or the ghost of Zettelkasten past advising a reluctant student. Spooky.

ZettelDistraction · March 24

Sein und Zettel deserves its Heidegger. I'll follow @Martin and Seamus Heaney.

Sascha · March 25

@Zettelkasten101 said:
I see that this conversation keeps going nowhere, as I suspected it would from the start. The gap between our positions is gigantic, and I don't think it can be bridged with just a few posts.

Your position is an example of the modern subject-object ontology, which is very common and hardly ever questioned nowadays. It is based upon the assumption that our world is fundamentally split into subject and object, the subject (mind, psyche, consciousness, inner world etc) being the place where all thinking and perception of meaning happens, governed by some mechanically understood assumed forces (studied by psychology), and the object being nothing but a sum of mass points governed by causal connections (laws of physics) and completely meaningless on its own. In this ontology, only that which is measurable (and therefore predictable and controllable via causal connections) is called truly ("objectively") real. In this ontology, it is impossible to comprehend the possibility of things having meaning by themselves (how?! the meaning is subjective!), which happens to be my and Heidegger's position.

You misrepresented my position gravely.

Here are some of them:

I don't split the world into subject-object as different domains. One of my core positions, similar to Heidegger's, is that thinking is part of the world. My model makes use of the concept of reentry (though, I don't know if my thinking is solid enough here).
I think that meaning is not only subjective, but objective, too.
I don't think that the world is nothing but a sum of mass points governed by causal connections because I reject causal closure

The weak point here is that you assume that the object-subject-difference is an assumption. It is not merely an assumption, but the result of reasoning.

This is one of the fundamental problems of Heidegger: Heidegger invented a gazillion strange words to explore a "what if", in his case "what if the difference between subject and object would not exist". It makes sense if you buy into it. However, you need to buy into it before it makes sense.

Once you build an entire philosophical system on vocabulary that only makes sense within its own framework, you've created something that is:

Difficult to falsify. (what would count as evidence against Dasein's Geworfenheit?)
Immune to translation. (not just linguistically, but conceptually)
Prone to self-sealing. (critics can always be accused of thinking from within the very metaphysics being critiqued)

Honestly, I can't think of a better argument here than "go read Heidegger" (since immersing in his texts would explain much more than my posts), but I guess it is not my place to tell someone what books they have to spend dozens or hundreds of hours on. Whether you want to get out of the subject-object thinking or not and whether you'll ever do it is entirely up to you. I merely wanted to say that there is no ghost in the box but there are many meaningful and very contextual connections and surprises there. And no, these are not the same as the ghost, nor is it appropriate to call any of my assumed "psychological constructs" like that. I think I have managed to convey this thought well enough.

You stated that you reject the subject-object-difference. But at this point you just refer to Heidegger saying "But Heidegger says X".

The Heideggerian position that you adopted offers a language to describe the phenomenology if you are in a specific psychological state. However, phenomenological derivativeness doesn't entail ontological or logical derivativeness. You can describe the subjectivity of being in the world (if you adopt his language), but that doesn't establish what it actually means of being in the world.

So, I think here is level-confusion at play. The observation that something appears to be like X does not justify the ontological status of X.

That being said, I want this set of comments to be the last one and only serve to clarify some aspects of Heidegger's philosophy for those who might be interested, not to continue the argument further:

@Sascha said:
It seems that you try to tightly adhere to Heideggerian thinking. But the mechanics of how you'd learn about the concept of a church is subject of psychological-scientific research. Philosophical thinking becomes speculation that is at odds with science and wisdom.

Well, at least you are correct about Heideggerian thinking being at odds with science, since modern psychological theories almost entirely consist of assumed things that don't really exist (according to Heidegger). Which is not to say that they aren't based on some real phenomena.

See above. The assumption that assumptions are at play is not correct.

harr · March 25

@Sascha said:
It is not merely an assumption, but the result of reasoning.

What is the starting point of your reasoning, if not some assumption?

Zettelkasten101 · March 26

@Sascha said:

I don't split the world into subject-object as different domains. One of my core positions, similar to Heidegger's, is that thinking is part of the world. My model makes use of the concept of reentry (though, I don't know if my thinking is solid enough here).

I think that meaning is not only subjective, but objective, too.

I don't think that the world is nothing but a sum of mass points governed by causal connections because I reject causal closure

I went a bit too far with simplification here, my bad. The most important thing for subject-object ontology is calculability, measurability, predictability and causal connections. The object is defined by how it "works" and how it can be controlled at the whim of the subject. Physics is just the most obvious example of this, but of course the objectification is characteristic of any research field today. I hinted at this when I wrote that psychology is about "some mechanically understood assumed forces", for example, since subject is more often than not objectified in this ontology as well. I'm guessing that when you talk about rejecting causal closure and about objectivity of meaning it means that some constructs in our psyche can affect the physical world through our bodies, thus becoming "objective" forces? If so, my point remains unchanged. These assumed objects in our "minds" do not exist and thus cannot affect anything. Things have meaning by appearing in some way to people, not by affecting some assumed inner-psychic objects.

The weak point here is that you assume that the object-subject-difference is an assumption. It is not merely an assumption, but the result of reasoning.

Nope.

This is one of the fundamental problems of Heidegger: Heidegger invented a gazillion strange words to explore a "what if", in his case "what if the difference between subject and object would not exist". It makes sense if you buy into it. However, you need to buy into it before it makes sense.

This "what if" is your interpretation. For Heidegger it was about "what is" from the very beginning.

Yes, it makes sense if you buy into it (i.e. once it makes sense). This is acknowledged by Heidegger himself. When you start questioning the very assumptions of other people's thinking, it becomes impossible to "prove" anything to them by drawing conclusions from statements because it is the very assumptions of their conclusion-drawing that you question. You can only try to show them how you see things, and the success of this showing depends on their ability to see for themselves. This is also why I wanted to end this discussion, because if you can't or don't want to comprehend Heidegger's philosophy than there is no point in me bothering you with my explanations.

Once you build an entire philosophical system on vocabulary that only makes sense within its own framework, you've created something that is:

Difficult to falsify. (what would count as evidence against Dasein's Geworfenheit?)

This one is simply ridiculous. Why on earth would Heidegger want to make his philosophy falsifiable if it was intended to be philosophy, not science?

Dasein's Geworfenheit (thrownness) is a term used to describe the fact that every living human being is always realizing one of the possibilities of existing at any moment. In other words, you can't "distance yourself" from your life, stop living for a while and then choose how exactly you want to live and start living anew in this chosen way. You always already exist in some way when you try to make any decision, you are "thrown" into always existing in some way. What is to falsify here when everyone can see for themselves that this is the case? I mean, it's like asking for statements like "people breathe" or "people drink water" to be falsifiable.

Immune to translation. (not just linguistically, but conceptually)

Difficult to translate, but definitely not immune.

Prone to self-sealing. (critics can always be accused of thinking from within the very metaphysics being critiqued)

Yes, most critics of Heidegger fail to comprehend his philosophy for this exact reason and it makes their critique invalid.

You stated that you reject the subject-object-difference. But at this point you just refer to Heidegger saying "But Heidegger says X".

It's both Heidegger's and my position. I simply wanted to bring the discussion to an end by presenting Heidegger's philosophy as a position alternative to yours that you don't have to argue with right here right now.

The Heideggerian position that you adopted offers a language to describe the phenomenology if you are in a specific psychological state. However, phenomenological derivativeness doesn't entail ontological or logical derivativeness. You can describe the subjectivity of being in the world (if you adopt his language), but that doesn't establish what it actually means of being in the world.

So, I think here is level-confusion at play. The observation that something appears to be like X does not justify the ontological status of X.

It's definitely not his language. Being-in-the-world is another name for there-being (Dasein) which is meant to replace any subjectivity. "Subjectivity of being in the world" is an oxymoron. Any understanding of anything, any appearing of anything as something to you, any mood ("psychological state") is a description of how you are in this world and of your world at the same time. There is no level-confusion here. The fact that something can appear to you as something it isn't was mentioned by me earlier and is acknowledged by Heidegger. Any false description is still a description of what is in a certain sense because there is someone who makes this mistake and this mistake is something that defines the world of that someone. How to distinguish true and false appearances is a separate issue.

It is pretty clear to me from this "adoption of Heidegger's language" that you don't understand his philosophy and this is fine. I repeat that I have no intention of forcing you to understand it and of continuing this discussion (which doesn't mean I won't answer anything here, but still).

ZettelDistraction · March 27

I find philosophy almost beyond the human capacity to do well. Here is a Zettel attempting to parse a single sentence.

---
id: Philo202603270034
title: Philo202603270034 Straussian blunders as resistant priors
reference-section-title: References
---

Straussian blunders as resistant priors

... Strauss writes, “If a master of the art of writing commits such blunders as would shame an intelligent high school boy, it is reasonable to assume that they are intentional.” One thing we can imagine a Great writer doing is teaching us that what seems like a blunder can actually be supported by rational argument. But this type of evidence for a secret teaching excludes that possibility.
-- Traldi, O. (2026, January 1). “Beneath the Surface of Straussianism.” The Philosophers’ Magazine. https://philosophersmag.com/beneath-the-surface-of-straussianism/

Rhetorically, the compression in this passage defeats straightforward parsing: the demonstrative pronouns “this” and “that,” combined with two senses of “teaching” and the too-strong use of “excludes,” confused this reader initially. The first occurrence of “teaching” refers to an explicit philosophical lesson conveyed by argument in the text. In the second use, “secret teaching” means a concealed doctrine inferred from an anomaly. “Interpretive bias” is more accurate than “exclusion,” which suggests either logical exclusion, evidential elimination, procedural prohibition, or psychological impossibility.

The Straussian move begins with strong assumptions about authorial competence and concealed intention. On that basis, it recruits a blunder as a sign of esotericism and discounts further textual evidence to the contrary, namely that the blunder is only apparent.

Traldi’s larger point is that Straussian philosophical education wrongly makes the extraction of hidden teachings from canonical writers its central pedagogical mission, whereas philosophical education ought to train students in open argumentative assessment instead.

Zettelkasten Forum

Philosophy of Zettelkasten: What is the Ghost in the Box?

Comments

Straussian blunders as resistant priors

SEE ALSO

Howdy, Stranger!

Quick Links

Categories

In this Discussion