Philosophy of Zettelkasten: What is the Ghost in the Box?

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Philosophy of Zettelkasten: What is the Ghost in the Box?

A detailed exploration of Luhmann's ZK note number 9/8,3 and what the notion of the 'ghost in the box' could mean.

Read the full story here

emps

And perhaps it is not yet the time to answer the question what this ghost is

Why not. This ghost is an amalgamation of your past selves (past thinking habits) that were partially imprinted on the structure of ZK while you've composed the notes.
The reason why others don't recognize the value of your ZK is exactly the same reason why any source of information might be useless: the lack of a proper background (the knowledge that your past selves have had).

In the spirit of Luhmann or with Luhmann’s hypothetical intention in mind?

Ancient Greeks and Romans thought that when one properly emulates god, one becomes its incarnation.
If you fight like a complete bastard you become Mars. Roman triumphator was clothed like Jupiter, driven in the proper chariot and regarded by others as a personification of Jupiter on Earth. It wasn't a show - he actually became (some part of) Jupiter. Triumphator even had a special slave that rode with him in the chariot and whispered "you're not god". Probably because triumphators tended to be carried away by their holyness and required a reminder that the incarnation was temporary.
If I'm not mistaken, the process was originally called apotheosis (modern meaning of this term is different - "glorification of rulers", but it was altered by Christianity in about 2-4 AD).

So when one acts like Luhmann, one becomes Luhmann. Prayers might (or might not) be optional.

edit: typos, clarity

GeoEng51

@emps said:
So when one acts like Luhmann, one becomes Luhmann. Prayers might (or might not) be optional.

Haha!

autonomygaps

I think that Luhmann is clearly playing on a rich ambiguity in the German language: "Geist" means not only "ghost/spook" but also "mind" and everything mental (even mental health or "state of mind" = Geisteszustand). In addition, it can be translated as "Spirit" in the sense of the "spirit of the age". In philosophy (my field), "Geist" is strongly associated with Hegel. His Phänomenologie des Geistes was once translated as "Phenomenology of Mind" but is not standardly translated as "Phenomenology of Spirit". But for Hegel – and Luhmann would have clearly been playing on this – "Spirit" is a very rich concept, referring to all aspects of culture, thought, practice, and more. So, in this passage, Luhmann is highlighting the absurdity of thinking that you can see his ideas by looking at the Zettelkästen. It would be like looking at the brain and expecting to see thoughts, or looking at a chessboard and thinking that the game is in the pieces of carved wood on a checkerboard.

Sascha

So, in this passage, Luhmann is highlighting the absurdity of thinking that you can see his ideas by looking at the Zettelkästen. It would be like looking at the brain and expecting to see thoughts, or looking at a chessboard and thinking that the game is in the pieces of carved wood on a checkerboard.

Pretty similar to the thinking behind software agnosticism.

rl911

Luhmann :

Ghost in the box? Viewers come. They get to see everything and nothing but that - like in a porn film. And the disappointment is correspondingly high.

Zettelkasten II Zettel 9/8,3
Geist im Kasten? Zuschauer kommen. Sie bekommen alles zu  sehen, und nichts als das – wie beim  Pornofilm. Und entsprechend ist die  Enttäuschung.

rl911

which closes the circle again ... you should not only read the rss-feed

chrisaldrich

With Hallowe'en just around the corner, I'm reminded that there are "other" versions of Geist im kasten 👻🗃️:

Content warning: paper-based zettelkasten nightmares.

https://i0.wp.com/boffosocko.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Ghostbusters-card-catalog.gif?resize=635,270&ssl=1

harr

Ryle is a very plausible candidate. "Ghost in the box" as word play on "Ghost in the machine" makes sense, if we look at this excerpt from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949), chapter 1 Descartes' Myth, section (2) The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine (emphasis mine):

I shall often speak of [the official theory], with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category-mistake. (…)
I must first indicate what is meant by the phrase ‘Category-mistake’. This I do in a series of illustrations.
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks “But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University." It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum and the University, to speak, that is, as if ‘the University’ stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members.

When Luhmann's visitors were disappointed, despite having seen everything, they could have made such a category-mistake. If we replace "University" with "Zettelkasten", we get:

The Zettelkasten is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the Zettelkasten has been seen.

That's very much how I would explain a Zettelkasten. The magic is how the parts are organized and coordinated. The magic is the workflow.

EDIT: Zettel 9/8,3 is part of Zettelkasten II's 9/8 branch, used by Luhmann to prepare the famous article Kommunikation mit Zettelkästen.

What is the article about? Luhmann approaches the Zettelkasten with communication theory ("kommunikationstheoretischen Ansatz"). He posits, that he communicates with the Zettelkasten, that it is a communication partner ("Kommunikationspartner").

Then he asks rhetorically: “How must the slip box be set up so that it acquires the corresponding communicative competence?” ("Wie muß der Zettelkasten angelegt sein, damit er entsprechende kommunikative Kompetenz erwirbt?") He answers with a description of his technique ("Technik").

What happens when you work with that technique for a while? “As a result of prolonged work with this technique, a kind of second memory emerges — an alter ego with which one can continuously communicate.” ("Als Ergebnis längerer Arbeit mit dieser Technik entsteht eine Art Zweitgedächtnis, ein alter Ego, mit dem man laufend kommunizieren kann.")

The article explains, what the visitors couldn't see in the box. As Ryle says, there is no "ghost" in the box/machine. There is no separate entity. There's only organisation and coordination.

Luhmann's article explains in detail how his Zettelkasten is organized and coordinated. He goes even a step further and describes it as communication partner. What makes the Zettelkasten a communication partner is not a ghost — it's a technique.

There is no ghost in the box.

Sukhovskii

My two cents on the topic in collage animation format

Sascha

The intro is just awesome.

For the content: Agreed.

harr

I'm still having nightmares from the halloween video. :-)

May I should build a ghost in the box to calm the nerves.

harr

Continuing a discussion from another thread, that references this thread here.

This comment by @Zettelkasten101 mentions the non-existing ghost in Luhmann's box:

I don't believe this ghost in the box exists, as @harr puts it in the comments under the article. Therefore, I can't be disappointed. Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those. Luhmann only said that 1) because of his theory, which I have no interest in, 2) as a metaphor, or 3) because he deceived himself. Which one of these, I don't really care. It can even be all three at once. Meanwhile, his techniques are so interesting to me that I am anything but disappointed while watching this "porn movie".

@Sascha replied here.

@Sascha said:
The "ghost" equals roughly to the constructs in psychology. Constructs like IQ or costumer satisfaction are created to deal with things that you can’t physically drop on a scale or measure with a ruler.

I had to look up "constructs". They seem to be an interesting concept.

But how do you make the connection to Luhmann's note?

@Sascha said:
Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

Do you have a particular term in mind?

@Sascha said:
These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Which of Luhmann's terms are do you mean in particular?

@Sascha said:
Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

Yes, you could say that and you would be right! I like Carl Sagan's premise in Dragons of Eden:

My fundamental premise about the brain is that its workings—what we sometimes call “mind”—are a consequence of its anatomy and physiology, and nothing more. “Mind” may be a consequence of the action of the components of the brain severally or collectively.

@Sascha said:
Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

I never heard anybody talk about "Geist" or "ghosts" in this way. Is this your own insight or do you have examples of other writers' work who use "Geist" or "ghost" in the sense of psychological constructs?

How do you know, that Luhmann didn't mean "mind", when he wrote "Geist"? Mind as in "mind in a box" or "mind of a box"? In the final article Kommunikation mit Zettelkasten Luhmann talks about the Zettelkasten's "geistiges Leben", which could be translated as "mental life".

Mind can be described as some kind of emergent phenomenon. Some parts of the article Kommunikation mit Zettelkästen make more sense, when you are aware of Luhmann's work on autopoiesis.

Personally I like to translate "Geist im Kasten" on the Zettel as "ghost in the box", because it works as a playful reference to Ryle's ghost in the machine and Ryle's story about disappointed visitors.

Luhmann's corresponding article Kommunikation mit Zettelkästen deals more with questions of mind.

Sukhovskii

@harr
There is another related topic, too.
https://forum.zettelkasten.de/discussion/2868/kommunikationspartner

Zettelkasten101

Well, if we have to go into this, full disclosure: my favourite philosopher is Martin Heidegger and I stand pretty much where he stands regarding all questions of "mind". Basically, his philosophy is about direct description of things the way they are, i.e. it rejects any supposed constructs that we cannot observe. Secondly, Heidegger argues that there is no "mind" if by "mind" we understand some kind of capsule or container for thoughts that is supposed to exist somewhere in our heads. What happens instead is that things are themselves meaningful, and we perceive their meaning directly from their places in our world. Simply put, thinking isn't something that happens inside our heads or brains but a relationship with our world, a kind of perception. I hope this short summary suffices to understand what I have to say below, I can unfold the explanation further if needed (though I am not a specialist in Heidegger and may not know something).

@Sascha said:

@Zettelkasten101 said:
I don't believe this ghost in the box exists, as @harr puts it in the comments under the article. Therefore, I can't be disappointed. Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those. Luhmann only said that 1) because of his theory, which I have no interest in, 2) as a metaphor, or 3) because he deceived himself. Which one of these, I don't really care. It can even be all three at once. Meanwhile, his techniques are so interesting to me that I am anything but disappointed while watching this "porn movie".

The "ghost" equals roughly to the constructs in psychology. Constructs like IQ or costumer satisfaction are created to deal with things that you can’t physically drop on a scale or measure with a ruler.

Exactly, they are created, meaning they don't exist before being created, they are added to the phemonenon. Much like the notion of "ghost" can be added to Zettelkasten but not observed there in the first place.

In the Zettelkasten world, these constructs are things like layers, complex ideas (ideas that span over multiple notes), and trains of thought.

Everything mentioned here exists and can be directly observed. Not really the case with the "ghost".

Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Are they? I think I make perfect sense of the Zettelkasten and its user when I say that it's a system of notes that allows the user to place and subsequently find similar thoughts together, be it with branches or links (this description can be elaborated further describing other aspects, like bibliography etc). Do I really need an unknown "ghost" here to make sense of the Zettelkasten? Or will its introduction just make the description confusing?

Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

Necessary for who? Making what sense? Observe or add? Honestly, I don't get what is it that we can observe with this ghost here. I don't even see how it can be "used" as an "instrument" for something. What are the benefits?

Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says. It also says that you can't find people's thoughts if you look at their brains, but that people may lose some or all of their possibilities of existing (e.g. thinking, speaking, walking, or even life itself) if something happens to their brains. Nothing in this simple observation, however, says that people's thoughts are some things that are somehow located in their brains. We can only conclude that brains are a necessary requirement for perceiving the meaning of things of our world from their places, much like our eyes are needed to see things from where they are but don't contain those things.

At the same time, a simple observation tells me that the Zettelkasten is not a human being, it doesn't live, doesn't talk. Everything I observe while working with it is that the notes that I myself wrote and put in there are conveniently located next to similar notes or linked to them (because that's how I put them in there). I also see that this helps me notice and think some new things when I reread my notes. Nothing in this simple observation tells me anything about a "ghost".

If we say that this rediscovery of my notes with conveniency can be called "communication", then perhaps the Zettelkasten can be called a "communication partner". If we then change the meaning of the word "ghost" to correspond to this, then we can say it's also a "ghost". Although in this case, the "ghost" still is a box of notes, not something that "lives" "somewhere (where?) inside" it. We can change the meaning of the word further if we really want. But the more we do this, the higher the risk of confusion gets. We may start to think that this "ghost" should be perceived as "something separate" from the notes, their contents, their arrangements. We may start to think that this "separate entity" is somehow "behind" the fact that we conveniently find similar notes close to each other or come up with something new while rereading them. But at this point it's no longer about generalization and higher levels of abstraction. Now it's about some unknown entity that we ourselves created in our thoughts and to which we try to attribute something that didn't need this attribution to be clearly understood at all. Shouldn't we draw a line here? I think we should, because there is a pretty clear line between 1) coming up with a general term for something directly observable (notes, links, surprises) and 2) creating some new entity which is supposed to "cause" these directly observable phenomena or be otherwise distinct from them.

When Luhmann spoke about a "ghost", it was either a metaphor or a self-deception (I doubt this one can be attributed to his theory). Why should we use this metaphor (at least I hope it's a metaphor) while risking to deceive ourselves and others with it? I don't know and I think we shouldn't. A surprise of unexpected thoughts doesn't require any explanation. It can be left to be what it is — a surprise.

P.S. I see how many things I wrote here can raise questions, but I hope that I managed to convey the "bare minimum" without getting into unnecessary detail. If you aren't interested in getting deeper into Heidegger's philosophy (much like I'm not interested in Luhmann's theory), that's perfectly fine by me. In fact, I would prefer not to get too deep into this (this is really not the kind of discussions I came here for).

harr

@Zettelkasten101 said:
Basically, his philosophy is about direct description of things the way they are

That's something I care a lot about. I have to read Heidegger. :-)

Secondly, Heidegger argues that there is no "mind" if by "mind" we understand some kind of capsule or container for thoughts that is supposed to exist somewhere in our heads.

I think that's the same point that Gilbert Ryle is making.

@Zettelkasten101 said:
This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says.

Yes! And there's whole branch of psychology, behaviorism, that doesn't care about "minds" at all, it simply observes and analyzes how human beings behave.

At the same time, a simple observation tells me that the Zettelkasten is not a human being, it doesn't live, doesn't talk.

Yes.

(…) Nothing in this simple observation tells me anything about a "ghost".
If we say that this rediscovery of my notes with conveniency can be called "communication", then perhaps the Zettelkasten can be called a "communication partner". If we then change the meaning of the word "ghost" to correspond to this, then we can say it's also a "ghost". Although in this case, the "ghost" still is a box of notes, not something that "lives" "somewhere (where?) inside" it. We can change the meaning of the word further if we really want. But the more we do this, the higher the risk of confusion gets. We may start to think that this "ghost" should be perceived as "something separate" from the notes, their contents, their arrangements. We may start to think that this "separate entity" is somehow "behind" the fact that we conveniently find similar notes close to each other or come up with something new while rereading them. But at this point it's no longer about generalization and higher levels of abstraction. Now it's about some unknown entity that we ourselves created in our thoughts and to which we try to attribute something that didn't need this attribution to be clearly understood at all. (…)

I really enjoyed this line of thought. Thank you!

Shouldn't we draw a line here?

Yes.

Maybe it helps to rephrase the question. Instead of asking what "ghost in the box" could mean, we could ask:

• What thought did the person Luhmann have in mind, when he wrote "Geist im Kasten?" on a paper slip, that was to be filed in his wooden box?
• Does the same or similar phrases appear in Luhmann's publications? Or is this a singular remark that appears only in one personal note?
• What is the appropriate english translation of "Geist im Kasten", so that Luhmann's understanding doesn't get lost in translation?
• Is the ghost a separate entitity?
• Does the Zettelkasten have a mind of its own?

Zettelkasten101

@harr said:
Yes! And there's whole branch of psychology, behaviorism, that doesn't care about "minds" at all, it simply observes and analyzes how human beings behave.

Not even remotely close to Heidegger, but it would take much time to explain the differences.

That's something I care a lot about. I have to read Heidegger. :-)

I would recommend starting with the works of Medard Boss. He was a pupil of Heidegger who applied his philosophy to "psychology" and whose books Heidegger himself edited. They are fairly easy to understand compared to Heidegger's own texts and are focused on discussing what human is without going into other topics of his philosophy too much which also helps to understand them better.

harr

@Zettelkasten101 said:
Not even remotely close to Heidegger, but it would take much time to explain the differences.

No need to. :-) This was about the mind as "black box" in psychology, not Heidegger.

I would recommend (…)

Thank you!

Sascha

@Zettelkasten101 said:
Well, if we have to go into this, full disclosure: my favourite philosopher is Martin Heidegger and I stand pretty much where he stands regarding all questions of "mind". Basically, his philosophy is about direct description of things the way they are, i.e. it rejects any supposed constructs that we cannot observe. Secondly, Heidegger argues that there is no "mind" if by "mind" we understand some kind of capsule or container for thoughts that is supposed to exist somewhere in our heads. What happens instead is that things are themselves meaningful, and we perceive their meaning directly from their places in our world. Simply put, thinking isn't something that happens inside our heads or brains but a relationship with our world, a kind of perception. I hope this short summary suffices to understand what I have to say below, I can unfold the explanation further if needed (though I am not a specialist in Heidegger and may not know something).

The problem with Heidegger, or, let's say, the Heideggerian thinking, is that you can't have it both. Either, things are observable as they are in the world. Then

@Sascha said:

@Zettelkasten101 said:
I don't believe this ghost in the box exists, as @harr puts it in the comments under the article. Therefore, I can't be disappointed. Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those. Luhmann only said that 1) because of his theory, which I have no interest in, 2) as a metaphor, or 3) because he deceived himself. Which one of these, I don't really care. It can even be all three at once. Meanwhile, his techniques are so interesting to me that I am anything but disappointed while watching this "porn movie".

The "ghost" equals roughly to the constructs in psychology. Constructs like IQ or costumer satisfaction are created to deal with things that you can’t physically drop on a scale or measure with a ruler.

Exactly, they are created, meaning they don't exist before being created, they are added to the phemonenon. Much like the notion of "ghost" can be added to Zettelkasten but not observed there in the first place.

What are you trying to say?

In the Zettelkasten world, these constructs are things like layers, complex ideas (ideas that span over multiple notes), and trains of thought.

Everything mentioned here exists and can be directly observed. Not really the case with the "ghost".

If they could be directly observed, you wouldn't need abstract concepts to make the observation possible in the first place. What a complex idea or a train of thought is, is dependent on your framework of perception. If you change your framework of perception, entities that qualify as complex ideas or trains of thought change.

I infer that you place a higher epistemic status on what you deem to be directly observed. But without such a qualification, the statement that something can be directly observed doesn't mean a lot.

But the notion that something can be directly observed is at odds with the psychology of biases, the age-old learning that we tend to trick ourselves easily and with everything that is not epistemic realism. (I know, Heidegger is not exactly a realist because he questions the subject-object difference which is the precondition for epistemic problems, but he is realist enough)

Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Are they? I think I make perfect sense of the Zettelkasten and its user when I say that it's a system of notes that allows the user to place and subsequently find similar thoughts together, be it with branches or links (this description can be elaborated further describing other aspects, like bibliography etc). Do I really need an unknown "ghost" here to make sense of the Zettelkasten? Or will its introduction just make the description confusing?

Yes. Abstractions allow to generalise. Generalisation is necessary to understand the underlying principles of instances. They allow us to move from the concrete incident to the pattern.

Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

Necessary for who? Making what sense? Observe or add? Honestly, I don't get what is it that we can observe with this ghost here. I don't even see how it can be "used" as an "instrument" for something. What are the benefits?

Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says.

The ability to form theories of minds is at the basis of empathy. Forming an idea of the mind of your fellow beings is at the very basis of empathy and understanding.

But you don't qualify your statement that my analogy is wrong. At this point you just point me to a different thinking framework. So, I see my analogy unchallenged.

It also says that you can't find people's thoughts if you look at their brains, but that people may lose some or all of their possibilities of existing (e.g. thinking, speaking, walking, or even life itself) if something happens to their brains. Nothing in this simple observation, however, says that people's thoughts are some things that are somehow located in their brains. We can only conclude that brains are a necessary requirement for perceiving the meaning of things of our world from their places, much like our eyes are needed to see things from where they are but don't contain those things.

At the same time, a simple observation tells me that the Zettelkasten is not a human being, it doesn't live, doesn't talk. Everything I observe while working with it is that the notes that I myself wrote and put in there are conveniently located next to similar notes or linked to them (because that's how I put them in there). I also see that this helps me notice and think some new things when I reread my notes. Nothing in this simple observation tells me anything about a "ghost".

If we say that this rediscovery of my notes with conveniency can be called "communication", then perhaps the Zettelkasten can be called a "communication partner". If we then change the meaning of the word "ghost" to correspond to this, then we can say it's also a "ghost". Although in this case, the "ghost" still is a box of notes, not something that "lives" "somewhere (where?) inside" it. We can change the meaning of the word further if we really want. But the more we do this, the higher the risk of confusion gets. We may start to think that this "ghost" should be perceived as "something separate" from the notes, their contents, their arrangements. We may start to think that this "separate entity" is somehow "behind" the fact that we conveniently find similar notes close to each other or come up with something new while rereading them. But at this point it's no longer about generalization and higher levels of abstraction. Now it's about some unknown entity that we ourselves created in our thoughts and to which we try to attribute something that didn't need this attribution to be clearly understood at all. Shouldn't we draw a line here? I think we should, because there is a pretty clear line between 1) coming up with a general term for something directly observable (notes, links, surprises) and 2) creating some new entity which is supposed to "cause" these directly observable phenomena or be otherwise distinct from them.

Nobody said that the ghost is a separate entity.

When Luhmann spoke about a "ghost", it was either a metaphor or a self-deception (I doubt this one can be attributed to his theory).

It could be all kinds of things not just those too.

Why should we use this metaphor (at least I hope it's a metaphor) while risking to deceive ourselves and others with it? I don't know and I think we shouldn't. A surprise of unexpected thoughts doesn't require any explanation. It can be left to be what it is — a surprise.

The explanation can facilitate making better decisions on how to foster (positive) surprise.

Zettelkasten101

@Sascha said:

@Zettelkasten101 said:
Well, if we have to go into this, full disclosure: my favourite philosopher is Martin Heidegger and I stand pretty much where he stands regarding all questions of "mind". Basically, his philosophy is about direct description of things the way they are, i.e. it rejects any supposed constructs that we cannot observe. Secondly, Heidegger argues that there is no "mind" if by "mind" we understand some kind of capsule or container for thoughts that is supposed to exist somewhere in our heads. What happens instead is that things are themselves meaningful, and we perceive their meaning directly from their places in our world. Simply put, thinking isn't something that happens inside our heads or brains but a relationship with our world, a kind of perception. I hope this short summary suffices to understand what I have to say below, I can unfold the explanation further if needed (though I am not a specialist in Heidegger and may not know something).

The problem with Heidegger, or, let's say, the Heideggerian thinking, is that you can't have it both. Either, things are observable as they are in the world. Then

@Sascha said:

@Zettelkasten101 said:
I don't believe this ghost in the box exists, as @harr puts it in the comments under the article. Therefore, I can't be disappointed. Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those. Luhmann only said that 1) because of his theory, which I have no interest in, 2) as a metaphor, or 3) because he deceived himself. Which one of these, I don't really care. It can even be all three at once. Meanwhile, his techniques are so interesting to me that I am anything but disappointed while watching this "porn movie".

The "ghost" equals roughly to the constructs in psychology. Constructs like IQ or costumer satisfaction are created to deal with things that you can’t physically drop on a scale or measure with a ruler.

Exactly, they are created, meaning they don't exist before being created, they are added to the phemonenon. Much like the notion of "ghost" can be added to Zettelkasten but not observed there in the first place.

What are you trying to say?

In the Zettelkasten world, these constructs are things like layers, complex ideas (ideas that span over multiple notes), and trains of thought.

Everything mentioned here exists and can be directly observed. Not really the case with the "ghost".

If they could be directly observed, you wouldn't need abstract concepts to make the observation possible in the first place. What a complex idea or a train of thought is, is dependent on your framework of perception. If you change your framework of perception, entities that qualify as complex ideas or trains of thought change.

I infer that you place a higher epistemic status on what you deem to be directly observed. But without such a qualification, the statement that something can be directly observed doesn't mean a lot.

But the notion that something can be directly observed is at odds with the psychology of biases, the age-old learning that we tend to trick ourselves easily and with everything that is not epistemic realism. (I know, Heidegger is not exactly a realist because he questions the subject-object difference which is the precondition for epistemic problems, but he is realist enough)

The thing here is that according to Heidegger not everything you think of some phenomenon qualifies as "abstract concept" if by this you mean "something not inherent to the phenomenon". It reminds me of his example about a church: the fact that the church is a building where people gather to do religion-related things is inseparable from the perception of the church as it is. If you don't see the church as something religion-related, then you do not see this church as church (you may still technically see it as "a building" or "something visible to your eyes"). Again, thinking is a kind of perception. Perceiving things as what they are includes thinking of them in a certain way appropriate to them.

But not all thinking is a kind of perception of things the way they are. Certain ways of thinking do not do justice to things. The most common example today is adding something to the phenomenon that "explains" it. E.g. the "mind" or "unconscious" is added to a human being in order to "explain" one's actions, although we can't actually observe anything like that nor is it necessary to do so to understand a human as human. Your example with customer satisfaction is also a case of this: you can't "work" with customers and their satisfaction as what they are, hence you replace them with some numbers or models (using some method) and work with them instead. These numbers or models, although useful, aren't inherent to the phenomenon of the (un)satisfied customer.

It is true that "what qulifies" as something may change in my thinking, but I can't see anyone disputing that Luhmann described complex ideas or his trains of thought on his cards unless we use these words in some highly unusual or specific meanings. Recognizing the fact that there are complex ideas or trains of thought in his notes is a case of perceiving things as what they are. They are directly observable to anyone who can read German (and Luhmann's handwriting where it isn't transcribed yet). I don't think that you perceive the Zettelkasten as what it is unless you can see that it is possible to write trains of thought there.

This is not the case with the "ghost". We can't use the usual meaning of this word here, we have to change it one way or another if we are to say that it is there. What's more, you don't have to see any ghosts in there in order to work with the Zettelkasten and to see that it can surprise you. I don't think there is any aspect of this system that you lose understanding of when you don't use the word.

Luhmann offered with his terms another way of approaching a higher-level view.

These are needed to make sense of the behaviour of the Zettelkasten and its relationship to its user.

Are they? I think I make perfect sense of the Zettelkasten and its user when I say that it's a system of notes that allows the user to place and subsequently find similar thoughts together, be it with branches or links (this description can be elaborated further describing other aspects, like bibliography etc). Do I really need an unknown "ghost" here to make sense of the Zettelkasten? Or will its introduction just make the description confusing?

Yes. Abstractions allow to generalise. Generalisation is necessary to understand the underlying principles of instances. They allow us to move from the concrete incident to the pattern.

I don't see what patterns (if any) this "ghost" would allow me to see that can't be seen with other terms.

Nobody said that the ghost is a separate entity.

Good, then it's just a highly confusing word that actually means... what?

The explanation can facilitate making better decisions on how to foster (positive) surprise.

I don't see how, so... how? And what exactly do I lose when I don't use this ghost "explanation"?

Ghosts are necessary byproducts of making sense of complex systems to observe emergent phenomena.

Necessary for who? Making what sense? Observe or add? Honestly, I don't get what is it that we can observe with this ghost here. I don't even see how it can be "used" as an "instrument" for something. What are the benefits?

Let's take this sentence as an example:

Even if Luhmann described it as a communication partner, a ghost (or spirit, or mind), or alter ego, a simple observation can tell me that it is none of those.

I could say the same of us: Our minds could be described as communication partners or ghosts. A simple observation of open our skulls could tell me that we are none of those. We are nothing but grey jelly.

This analogy is wrong. My everyday "communication partners" are fellow human beings, not their "minds" or brains. I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say. I don't see any ghosts or minds, I see people. This is what a simple observation says.

The ability to form theories of minds is at the basis of empathy. Forming an idea of the mind of your fellow beings is at the very basis of empathy and understanding.

This is why I wrote "I can observe other people directly as they do something meaningful, I can directly hear and understand what they have to say", but I see you need clarification. We can perceive others as having thoughts, i.e. as perceiving something through thinking. This does not mean that we have to assume that their thinking happens in their heads. "Theory of mind" is not the basis of understanding, since I can perceive people as having thoughts, wishes, opinions etc without attributing all of this to some imaginary capsule called "mind" in their heads. When I say that I see and talk to people, not their minds, it doesn't mean that I perceive people as robots or other lifeless things. On the contrary, perceiving people as who they are includes perceiving them as thinking, feeling, wanting etc.

@Sascha said:
But you don't qualify your statement that my analogy is wrong. At this point you just point me to a different thinking framework. So, I see my analogy unchallenged.

By using this analogy you wanted to say (I assume) that my claim about the absence of the "ghost" because it is not directly observable is absurd because if we apply this to humans then we would have to conclude that they are nothing but a grey jelly without mind which would also be absurd in your opinion (I assume).

It is a wrong analogy because
1) A direct observation of human beings means not only opening their skulls but also observing and understanding what they do, including thinking, feeling and other things that you attribute to their "minds". This direct observation is more similar to what I meant by a simple observation of the Zettelkasten than what you assumed to qualify as a direct observation of a human being in your analogy. An accurate analogy to your "direct observation" would be saying that nothing written in Luhmann's Zettelkaten means anything.
2) We do not have to assume that people have "minds" even based on this more rich and accurate observation that I described. Concluding that people don't have "minds" is not the same as concluding that they can't think, feel etc, meaning it's not the same as concluding that they are nothing but a grey jelly. Therefore, you can't connect the absurdity of reducing people to grey jelly to denying the existence of minds. Therefore, you can't by analogy say that my denying of a ghost is absurd because denying minds is absurd (I deny both and neither denial is absurd, in other words).

Put simply, saying that there is no ghost in the Zettelkasten is indeed somewhat similar to saying that people don't have minds and I say both of these things. But saying that people are nothing but their brains is similar to saying that the Zettelkasten is but an ink randomly spilled on a bunch of paper slips, and I say neither of these things.

Is this understandable enough?