Zettelkasten Forum


Relationship between Ontology and Epistemiology

Comments

  • @Sascha said:

    @Andy Going through my second brain (I call it Rumen), I encountered a possible project called "Practical Ontology and Systems Theory". The entities I construct, though they are similar to knowledge building blocks, are not an equivalent. Entities are for example:

    • Justification
    • Difference
    • Completeness
    • Statement
    • State
    • Boundary
    • Part
    • Whole

    You have a set of concepts there. Some of them are ontological in the strict philosophical sense, that is, representing reality, like state, boundary, part, whole, whereas others I would take to be logical and epistemological, like statement and justification.

    A justification could be (most likely is) part of the inventory for other classification systems of information, still I don't put them in the same category. I am something like a knowledge realist: I think knowledge is a real entity that you can understand and research, not a knowledge constructivist who would put knowledge in the realm of the mind.

    Perhaps, the biggest difference between knowledge building blocks and the above-mentioned approaches is that the approaches are functional/linguistic. Oh, I repeated myself. But I let it in, since this is a major pillar for me.

    I am not attached to any particular definition of knowledge. :) There are many good ones that can be very different. I have been reading Mario Bunge's Philosophical Dictionary, and I was shocked by how loose is his definition of knowledge in that book (I thought I could do better!), when he has such detailed discussions of knowledge in other books.

  • @Andy said:
    @Sascha said:

    @Andy Going through my second brain (I call it Rumen), I encountered a possible project called "Practical Ontology and Systems Theory". The entities I construct, though they are similar to knowledge building blocks, are not an equivalent. Entities are for example:

    • Justification
    • Difference
    • Completeness
    • Statement
    • State
    • Boundary
    • Part
    • Whole

    You have a set of concepts there. Some of them are ontological in the strict philosophical sense, that is, representing reality, like state, boundary, part, whole, whereas others I would take to be logical and epistemological, like statement and justification.

    Just picking some examples to show, why I think this is not that straight forward:

    1. Is the body (whole) made out of cells or out of organs (parts)? The whole/part distinction is not strictly reality.
    2. Is the intestinal tract part of the body or outside the body, since the body is a donut?

    The boundary between reality and perception is not that straight forward.

    My main point (hence Practical Ontology) is that there is decisional freedom that has to be rooted in some fundamental principles of good thinking.

    Even the concept of statement is not easily put into the epistemological realm, since a statement is also an entity in reality.

    The assumption that ontology and epistemology are separate planes of existing (using this term like in Dungeons and Dragons) is quite often not holding up. I mean it in a sense that I want to make theoretical philosophy relevant to thinking quality.

    A justification could be (most likely is) part of the inventory for other classification systems of information, still I don't put them in the same category. I am something like a knowledge realist: I think knowledge is a real entity that you can understand and research, not a knowledge constructivist who would put knowledge in the realm of the mind.

    Perhaps, the biggest difference between knowledge building blocks and the above-mentioned approaches is that the approaches are functional/linguistic. Oh, I repeated myself. But I let it in, since this is a major pillar for me.

    I am not attached to any particular definition of knowledge. :) There are many good ones that can be very different. I have been reading Mario Bunge's Philosophical Dictionary, and I was shocked by how loose is his definition of knowledge in that book (I thought I could do better!), when he has such detailed discussions of knowledge in other books.

    This was the state of the philosophy of knowledge when I focused on other stuff. There are a lot of detailed discussions just for a shitty end result.

    I think that Ansgar Beckermann is spot on with his essay "Zur Inkohärenz und Irrelevanz des Wissensbegriffs. Plädoyer für eine neue Agenda in der Erkenntnistheorie", in which he basically say that the philosophical concept of knowledge is self-contradictory.

    I am a Zettler

  • @Sascha said:

    @Andy said:
    You have a set of concepts there. Some of them are ontological in the strict philosophical sense, that is, representing reality, like state, boundary, part, whole, whereas others I would take to be logical and epistemological, like statement and justification.

    Just picking some examples to show, why I think this is not that straight forward:

    1. Is the body (whole) made out of cells or out of organs (parts)? The whole/part distinction is not strictly reality.
    2. Is the intestinal tract part of the body or outside the body, since the body is a donut?

    "The whole/part distinction is not strictly reality." Correct! The whole/part distinction is not strictly reality, it is (or can be) ontological, a representation of an aspect reality. There is probably no representation of an aspect of reality that is perfect for all purposes.

    1. The body is made of cells and it is made of organs and it is made of other things. This is no problem for ontology. Complex biomedical and anatomical ontologies can represent many such facts.
    2. I don't know, but I guess the cells that compose the lining of the intestinal tract are part of the body, and what travels through the tract is outside the body. But even if there is some irreducible ambiguity here, that is not a problem, because it can be decided by convention based on the best available reasoning.

    All of this is still ontology because we are representing reality, not analyzing the general adequacy of cognitive processes as in epistemology and methodology.

    By the way, whole and part could also be applied to conceptual structures that don't refer to reality, but this would be ontology in the information-science sense, which is the systematization and formalization of one or more domains of discourse, not the philosophical sense of representing reality that I am using here.

    The boundary between reality and perception is not that straight forward.

    But here you are omitted a third term: representation, which is neither appearance (content of perception) nor reality. Of course, representations need to be made in a perceivable form to be usable, but representation is not perception. Semiology or semiotics is the main field that I associate with the study of representation; it overlaps with logic, epistemology, etc.

    Reality can be defined as straightforwardly distinct from perception (see below). We think about appearances at some point when we represent reality, but logically appearances and reality can be straightforwardly differentiated.

    My main point (hence Practical Ontology) is that there is decisional freedom that has to be rooted in some fundamental principles of good thinking.

    That "decisional freedom that has to be rooted in some fundamental principles of good thinking" is studied and taught in epistemology, methodology, applied psychology, etc. In the information-science sense of ontology there is much more freedom than in the philosophical sense of ontology as representing reality.

    Even the concept of statement is not easily put into the epistemological realm, since a statement is also an entity in reality.

    The truth value of "a statement is also an entity in reality" depends on how we define statement and reality. :) Here is an example of reasonable definitions of statement and reality (and concept) that easily put statements in the domain of logic, semiology, and epistemology and not in reality:

    1. A concept is a simple unit of meaning used to compose statements.
    2. A statement, equivalent to a proposition, is the meaningful conceptual structure (structure of concepts) asserted by a declarative sentence.
    3. Reality is whatever exists independently of what we think.

    Concepts and conceptual structures do not exist independently of what we think—they are units of meanings, which are cognitive—therefore they are not in reality, according to the preceding definition of reality. (Some philosophers reject definitions of statement/proposition like this one and only speak about sentences because they don't like the ontological/metaphysical assumptions involved in such a definition.)

    Thinking happens in the living brain (or perhaps in other cognitive agents). The brain exists regardless of whether we think about it, and therefore the brain is in reality. But meanings and their units such as concepts and statements, which we could call contents of thinking, do not exist independently of thinking (they don't exist when we're not thinking), so are not in reality, in this definition of reality.

    You could define statement and reality differently so as to make "a statement is also an entity in reality" true, but the definitions above are not unreasonable.

    The assumption that ontology and epistemology are separate planes of existing (using this term like in Dungeons and Dragons) is quite often not holding up. I mean it in a sense that I want to make theoretical philosophy relevant to thinking quality.

    They are not separate in the sense of being unrelated; they are certainly related. Epistemology is like general quality control for our thinking and our activities related to thinking. Ontology in the philosophical sense that I have used above is thinking applied to the representation of reality. Because representing reality is difficult and easy to mess up, the thinking that we use to do it requires quality control.

  • Disclaimer: I got off-track quite a lot. So, perhaps read my comments more as "rants sometimes inspired by your post, sometimes merely caused by it."

    I am quite struggling to write about this topic in English. So, expect subpar precision.

    @Andy said:
    @Sascha said:

    @Andy said:
    You have a set of concepts there. Some of them are ontological in the strict philosophical sense, that is, representing reality, like state, boundary, part, whole, whereas others I would take to be logical and epistemological, like statement and justification.

    Just picking some examples to show, why I think this is not that straight forward:

    1. Is the body (whole) made out of cells or out of organs (parts)? The whole/part distinction is not strictly reality.
    2. Is the intestinal tract part of the body or outside the body, since the body is a donut?

    "The whole/part distinction is not strictly reality." Correct! The whole/part distinction is not strictly reality, it is (or can be) ontological, a representation of an aspect reality. There is probably no representation of an aspect of reality that is perfect for all purposes.

    1. The body is made of cells and it is made of organs and it is made of other things. This is no problem for ontology. Complex biomedical and anatomical ontologies can represent many such facts.
    2. I don't know, but I guess the cells that compose the lining of the intestinal tract are part of the body, and what travels through the tract is outside the body. But even if there is some irreducible ambiguity here, that is not a problem, because it can be decided by convention based on the best available reasoning.

    All of this is still ontology because we are representing reality, not analyzing the general adequacy of cognitive processes as in epistemology and methodology.

    The idea I am coming from is that ontological decisions (e.g. whether the body is made out of cells or out of organs) can be evaluated for their adequacy.

    You are saying both. I'd say it is way more adequate to say that the body is made out of organs (which are made out of cells), since the concept of body includes the self-organization and not just the mass of substance.

    To give a practical example: When you measure the change in mitochondrial mass before and after a training invention, you take a muscle sample, put everything in the blender and then test for markers. Here, intensity beats volume (interval training vs. low intensity endurance training). The problem with this method is that you "blend away" the muscle structure. With low-intensity training you train mainly your slow-twitch fibres, leaving the fast-twitch fibres out of the training stimulus. With high-intensity training, you train your fast twitch fibres as well. So, the total increase in mitochondrial mass is higher in high-intensity training, yet the training effectiveness might be lower. Why? You need to increase mitochondria where they are needed. In many cases, you are mainly working with your slow-twitch fibres. You want your training to be effected here.

    Still, this structural problem is often ignored, and interval training is deemed to be more effective for mitochondrial content (yet other studies show the total training volume is the driver for total mitochondrial mass which are in contradiction)

    With "ontological awareness" such thinking errors could be reduced in frequency. I say that with my coaching experience in mind. Quite often, I am able to move the thinking of clients forward, just because I am ontological aware. I include basic concepts like time, space, substance etc. in my thinking.

    It seems to me that there is an interval momentum of philosophy to make itself irrelevant for practical purposes and therefore ultimately ornamental. This:

    I don't know, but I guess the cells that compose the lining of the intestinal tract are part of the body, and what travels through the tract is outside the body. But even if there is some irreducible ambiguity here, that is not a problem, because it can be decided by convention based on the best available reasoning.

    is unsatisfying to me. If ontology is truly the study of being, it has to apply to everything. But anytime you think about ontology and neighboring disciplines like epistemology, you get a strange dynamic that separates the intense thinking about it and the practical relevance. Why bother at all if decisions can be made "by convention and best available reasoning"? If ontology has nothing relevant to say about reality it reduced itself to intellectual masturbation. This, too, is a question about reality. If ontology is just about intellectual masturbation, then it might be done just for fun. But then it is as relevant and deserving of attention as chess or Fortnite.

    I think that contrary is true: Ontology is relevant and should be researched and thought about as a future thinking tool box.

    By the way, whole and part could also be applied to conceptual structures that don't refer to reality, but this would be ontology in the information-science sense, which is the systematization and formalization of one or more domains of discourse, not the philosophical sense of representing reality that I am using here.

    Repeating myself from above. The problem I have is that there is the assumption that the mind is not in reality, that representations and perceptions are not in reality but somehow outside of it.

    I think this was in a fantasy book: We are the consiousness of a god that tries to understand itself. This self-referencial picture speaks to my sentiment: There is nothing outside of reality. Even fantasy is a real thing (as a fantasy).

    The boundary between reality and perception is not that straight forward.

    But here you are omitted a third term: representation, which is neither appearance (content of perception) nor reality. Of course, representations need to be made in a perceivable form to be usable, but representation is not perception. Semiology or semiotics is the main field that I associate with the study of representation; it overlaps with logic, epistemology, etc.

    I think perception and representation are too tightly intertwined to gain a meaningful and practical thinking tool if you separate them.

    Representation have to be perceived to be available. At the same time, representations are the precondition to even perceive.

    I think a much more crude and primitive model (even that is just a representation...):

    1. The realm of the mind.
    2. Reality.

    Perception and representation are both in the mind. Yet, they are entities in reality. The distinction isn't even consistent at the foundation. (I deem this difference as foundational to even start with all the other distinctions)

    Reality can be defined as straightforwardly distinct from perception (see below). We think about appearances at some point when we represent reality, but logically appearances and reality can be straightforwardly differentiated.

    My main point (hence Practical Ontology) is that there is decisional freedom that has to be rooted in some fundamental principles of good thinking.

    That "decisional freedom that has to be rooted in some fundamental principles of good thinking" is studied and taught in epistemology, methodology, applied psychology, etc. In the information-science sense of ontology there is much more freedom than in the philosophical sense of ontology as representing reality.

    I wouldn't give epistemiology that much credit for decisional freedom. At least, whatever I read is written in the binary code truth/false. At least in philosophy, it is about what is the case and what is not. I operate in the binary code of pragmatism, not in a philosophical sense, but in a much more crude sense.

    For example: I am ethically more interested in what decisions can be made properly by either coming from a deontological or utilitarian perspective. I am not interested what the final judgment about the nature of ethics is.

    Even the concept of statement is not easily put into the epistemological realm, since a statement is also an entity in reality.

    The truth value of "a statement is also an entity in reality" depends on how we define statement and reality. :) Here is an example of reasonable definitions of statement and reality (and concept) that easily put statements in the domain of logic, semiology, and epistemology and not in reality:

    1. A concept is a simple unit of meaning used to compose statements.
    2. A statement, equivalent to a proposition, is the meaningful conceptual structure (structure of concepts) asserted by a declarative sentence.
    3. Reality is whatever exists independently of what we think.

    Concepts and conceptual structures do not exist independently of what we think—they are units of meanings, which are cognitive—therefore they are not in reality, according to the preceding definition of reality. (Some philosophers reject definitions of statement/proposition like this one and only speak about sentences because they don't like the ontological/metaphysical assumptions involved in such a definition.)

    Thinking happens in the living brain (or perhaps in other cognitive agents). The brain exists regardless of whether we think about it, and therefore the brain is in reality. But meanings and their units such as concepts and statements, which we could call contents of thinking, do not exist independently of thinking (they don't exist when we're not thinking), so are not in reality, in this definition of reality.

    I am familiar with this line of thinking. But I think the problem is on the premise-level. I don't think that (part of reality) exist independent of what we think, since what we think is part of reality. So, our thinking is identical with part of reality.

    To me, it is absurd to think that my thinking is not a real thing. When I think something different, this part of reality changes.

    You could define statement and reality differently so as to make "a statement is also an entity in reality" true, but the definitions above are not unreasonable.

    The assumption that ontology and epistemology are separate planes of existing (using this term like in Dungeons and Dragons) is quite often not holding up. I mean it in a sense that I want to make theoretical philosophy relevant to thinking quality.

    They are not separate in the sense of being unrelated; they are certainly related. Epistemology is like general quality control for our thinking and our activities related to thinking. Ontology in the philosophical sense that I have used above is thinking applied to the representation of reality. Because representing reality is difficult and easy to mess up, the thinking that we use to do it requires quality control.

    I am a Zettler

Sign In or Register to comment.